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To put it simply, everyone interested in Kant’s philosophy and/or in the way 
art and nature connect to our morality and our culture, should read Bradley 
Murray’s book. Reader-friendly and easily accessible even to those who have 
not spent their lives studying the philosophical giant that is Kant, Murray’s 
book offers an intriguing insight into some of the often-neglected aspects 
of Kant’s aesthetics. Beginning with the simple question, why is it ok for 
us to pursue aesthetic pleasures provided by art and nature, Murray not 
only manages to explain the relevance of aesthetic pleasure for our personal 
development and social wellbeing, but he does so by situating Kant’s theory 
of beauty against a wider background of Kant’s works, primarily his anthro-
pology and moral psychology. While most of those who work on Kant’s third 
Critique tend to either analyze it in connection to the fi rst or the second 
Critique (i.e. either to Kant epistemology or to Kant’s ethics), Murray man-
ages to offer a new look at the third Critique by situating it against Kant’s 
accounts of emotions, passions and culture, as developed in his Lectures on 
Anthropology, Metaphysics of Morals, Toward Perpetual Peace and his other 
works of more empirical bent. A result is an intelligible, clear, precise and 
above all informative book which motivates one to take up Kant and see his 
instance, the taste predicates. But the very bringing together of a very wide 
range of domains from aesthetic, through moral all the way to epistemic 
modals, and future contingent matters, and offering a way to systematize 
the phenomena appearing in these domains, is an impressive achievement.
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aesthetics, as well as his overall philosophical system, in new light. In what 
follows, I will briefl y present a chapter-by-chapter summary of the main 
claims, and I will end by raising some concerns for Murray’s views.
Murray’s mission is to show how Kant justifi es his claim that pursu-
ing aesthetic pleasure is morally relevant because doing so promotes our 
capacity to act effectively as moral agents. Therefore, various sorts of anti-
aesthetic claims (such as those inspired by Rousseau, according to which 
marvelling at the beauties of art nurtures in people the pettiness of soul, 
deters people from engaging with political concerns and thus keeps them 
in servitude, or is expressive of one’s self-indulgent tendencies) should be 
rejected. Pursuing beauty, devoting our time and resources to beauties and 
aesthetic pleasures, can help bring about happier life for an individual and 
more fl ourishing to the society. As Murray puts it in the Introduction, ex-
plaining Kant’s view of social order developed in his Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, people by nature exhibit a kind of ‘unso-
ciable sociability’ i.e. they want to live in a society but they also want to be 
free from demands of social cooperation and left to pursue their own desires. 
Because the two are often incompatible, in that an individual is often faced 
with a challenge of balancing her desires and the obligations towards so-
ciety, it is only through moral development that an individual can become 
socialized and capable of putting aside her inclinations. Equally important 
is development of one’s capacities to exercise reason publically, i.e. to be 
guided by one’s own understanding. As Murray shows, both of these aims—
development of personal and social culture—can be served and promoted 
via the pursuit of aesthetic pleasures.
In the fi rst chapter, Murray explains the centrality of individual’s moral 
development for Kant’s overall view of nature as ultimately hospitable for, 
and at the service of, humanity’s moral progression. Passions and inclina-
tions hold people back from acting from duty and keep them committed 
to pursuing their individual desires. Not only can this be detrimental for 
sociability generally, but it can eventually lead one to suicide, as it can 
easily happen that one is no longer able to provide for the material things 
one has been relying upon for one’s happiness. While the pursuit of luxury 
(that is, pursuit of that which is agreeable to one) can initially be benefi cial, 
in that it keeps one away from pursuing more bodily-based passions, in 
the long run, it is only the pursuit of aesthetic pleasure inspired by beauty 
that can indeed be benefi cial for moral development. Two main functions of 
the experiences of beauty are of paramount importance here, claims Mur-
ray. First, its ability to cultivate in us the capacity to feel love, as stated in 
§29 of the third Critique, and its capacity to teach us to step back from our 
inclinations, due to its disinterested nature. The strength, beauty and ap-
peal of Murray’s book is in his construction of these two claims from Kant’s 
numerous works, and in his showing their full theoretical and practical im-
plications.
Second chapter is dedicated to the bond between beauty and love. The 
emotion of love fosters our moral development because it helps us distance 
ourselves from our inclinations, preparing us to love something apart from 
any interest. However, the step from enjoying natural beauty to feeling love 
is only made possible via the emotion of gratitude: as Kant sees it, the expe-
 Book Reviews 455
riences of beauty inspire in us a sense of gratitude towards whichever mak-
er, actual or hypothetical, that created such beauty. This, in turn, mobilizes 
in us a desire to give to others out of love. This chapter is also insightful in 
explicating Kant’s overall view on love and its connection to our morality 
and social interactions.
Chapter three turns to one of the most contentious aspects of Kant’s 
aesthetic theory, his claim regarding the disinterestedness of judgments 
of beauty. Connecting Kant’s account of disinterestedness as developed in 
third Critique with his account of ‘contemplative pleasure’ of beauty pre-
sented in his Metaphysics of Morals, Murray reconstructs the relevance of 
disinterestedness for moral development. Most signifi cantly, the pleasure 
of beauty is contrasted to the pleasures of agreeable, which are not only 
connected to our desires, thus motivating us to pursue them, but foster our 
tendency to become attached to objects and to want to posses them. Nothing 
of the kind is the case with pleasures of beauty, given that no one can posses 
the beauties of nature. Disinterested character of the experience of beauty, 
understood as a lack of concern or desire for the object or its existence, has 
often puzzled Kant’s readers in that it is not altogether clear how we can 
pursue the experience of beautiful objects without caring for their contin-
ual existence. But as Murray clarifi es, central to disinterestedness is that 
“whatever desire I have for the object to exist is not central to the pleasure 
I feel” (48). A second aspect of disinterestedness, revelatory of Burke’s infl u-
ence over Kant, is that a desire to understand the object “does not occupy a 
prominent place in experiences of (...) pleasure” (49). Pleasures of beauty, 
in other words, are severed from intellectual (or emotional) pleasures that 
objects of beauty may provide, though this doesn’t imply that the pleasure 
of beauty is radically disinterested. In other words, “it is not a state charac-
terized by the application of absolutely no concepts, and it is not a state in 
which we attend to a special subjective object” (57). Murray is here careful 
to situate this aspect of Kant’s theory against Kant’s division between free 
and adherent beauty (where a desire to understand can coexist with the 
pleasure of beauty). Pursuing aesthetic pleasure makes it possible for us 
to distance ourselves from our desires and inclinations, and to bracket our 
concerns, and to do so in a pleasurable way which does not make a demand 
for self denial (as, for example, some other ways of pursuing moral wisdom 
might, as when the agent is supposed to rationally grasp the demands of 
pursuing his own duty).
In chapter four, Murray discusses our aesthetic interest in, and pleasure 
derived from, works of art. Two questions concern him; fi rst, whether pur-
suing art can be benefi cial to our moral development, and second, whether 
the experiences of aesthetic pleasures triggered by art can be analyzed 
along the same lines as experiences of pleasure derived from nature (i.e. via 
the notion of disinterestedness). One infl uential line of reasoning that Kant 
engages with concerns responding to Rousseau’s anti-aestheticism. Not 
only can works of art foster problematic moral attitudes, thus distracting us 
from our moral duties, but it can easily happen that an interest in art is in 
fact a concern for one’s own status and reputation. In other words, art lovers 
are not after moral development but after indulging their own vanity and 
status-seeking, concerned only with being envied by others for their good 
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taste. Such concerns can fuel passions which are detrimental for moral de-
velopment, particularly a passion for recognition, for self indulgence and for 
one’s status. While Kant is aware of this potentially inhibiting infl uence of 
art for our moral interest, he nevertheless thinks there might be good conse-
quences to those engagements with artworks motivated by reputation and 
vanity: even in these cases, the underlying motivation of a vain person is a 
desire to communicate, to relate to another human being and to fi nd some 
common ground, i.e. shared aesthetic taste, with others. Such concerns can 
contribute to one’s moral development, even if one’s initial motivation in 
pursuing art was not morally praiseworthy.
What about disinterestedness with respect to works of art? Because they 
are primarily artefacts, our engagements with them can inspire a desire to 
understand them, to know the original intentions of their makers and to 
know which purpose they aimed to fulfi l. Such knowledge however under-
mines the attitude of disinterestedness, which in turn undermines the pos-
sibility of moral development. Nonetheless, Murray suggests, one’s experi-
ence of artwork can still be disinterested, as long as one is able to undergo a 
process of abstraction, i.e. attend to the object as it strikes the eye. As Mur-
ray argues, this includes taking “a step back in our experience of the object 
so that this experience is not taken over by our desire to understand the 
object” (75). The more one is able to do this, the more disinterested one’s ex-
perience of art is. Disinterestedness is thus a matter of degree. This chapter 
closes with an analysis of the notion of a genius and its relation to beautiful 
art. As Kant famously claims, beautiful art is only possible as a product of a 
genius, that is, as a product by someone who is oblivious to the roots of his 
art, but endowed with a gift of nature to produce beautiful artworks. How-
ever, as Murray objects, this kind of ‘metaphysical’ reading is problematic, 
in that one can admire an artwork for its beauty even if the artwork is in 
fact a product of copying rather than a product of original creation through 
genius. Murray therefore concludes that Kant’s account of creation via ge-
nius should be understood ‘epistemically’. “Kant’s doctrine of genius is to 
function partly as extension of his account of abstraction” (77) claims Mur-
ray, which is to say that one should experience the artwork “as if it were the 
product of mere nature, rather than as the product of a determinate act of 
making” (77). Consequently, our experiences of artistic beauty include the 
representation of the work as a quasi-natural entity. This interpretation is 
in line with Kant’s claim that genius is the innate mental aptitude through 
which nature gives the rule to art. Murray argues that this interpretation 
makes it easier for us to understand Kant’s claims according to which an 
artwork appears as nature and doesn’t exhibit any sign of having been in-
tentionally created. We seek teleological understanding of natural entities, 
so our desire to understand the maker’s intentions with respect to works 
of art can be accommodated under our wider teleological estimation. One 
aspect of artistic creation not easily resolved by Kant’s theory is the fact 
that many of our artworks are not pleasing in light of their beauty (Mur-
ray analyses Duchamp’s Fountain as a telling example) and that many are 
endowed with ethical dimension.
In the fi fth chapter Murray’s attention turns to sublime, whose relation 
to morality is far more intimate than that of beauty. But, wonders Murray, 
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how exactly does it foster our moral development, and why think that it 
does, when it is not connected to love but to the sense of respect and self es-
teem? Another issue with the notion of sublime concerns its mixed nature; 
it is inherently contra-fi nal and therefore displeasureable, and yet, it can be 
noted with an expression of approval. To address these issues, Murray fi rst 
explicates the relevance of respect and esteem for our morality. A respect 
for the moral law itself is relevant, because humans are never completely 
free of passions and inclinations which deter us from following the moral 
law. Respect also matters as a pathological (rather than practical) feeling, 
designating a feeling of the dignity of human nature, which helps us act 
with greater impartiality. Finally, respect is also directed towards oneself, 
i.e. one’s personhood. As a form of self-respect and self-esteem, derived from 
one’s realization of, and appreciation of, one’s rational nature, this feeling 
helps us fend off our animal inclinations and other ‘worldly’ concerns which 
should seem trivial when recognized as standing opposite to out rationality. 
Murray then goes on to analyze variations of sublimity, particularly math-
ematical, to explain the cognitive operation of our minds which are relevant 
for this experience, and mental states that Kant subsumes under sublimity 
(such as the feeling of disappointment with humanity). On the whole, Mur-
ray concludes that the experience of sublimity can serve our moral develop-
ment because it is, like the experience of beauty, disinterested and pleasur-
able. However, Kant’s account of sublime is not all together satisfying, as 
he does not in fact make enough effort to explore the connection between 
sublimity and art, i.e. artistic sublimity.
The sixth chapter is dedicated to what is perhaps the most challeng-
ing issue with respect to Kant’s philosophy: that of justifying the pursuit 
of culture over and above the pursuit of one’s inclinations. In other words, 
why strive toward moral progress (i.e. culture), when not doing so can make 
for a much more enjoyable life? To answer this challenge, Murray explores 
Kant’s ethical writings, explicating Kant’s arguments in favour of pursuing 
culture. He fi rst explores a set of arguments designed from Metaphysics of 
Morals and the Groundwork. In Metaphysics Kant claims that pursuit of 
culture is a duty stemming from that aspect of ourselves that is unique to 
our humanity, our reason. Because reason induces us to strive toward per-
fection, we have to strive toward culture. In the Groundwork, Kant, devel-
oping the three formulations of categorical imperative, discusses the case 
of a man who contemplates turning his back to his talent. Kant concludes 
that it is impossible that a rational agent should will that anything like the 
maxim of enjoyment should become a universal law. Murray is here rather 
critical of Kant’s argumentation, fi nding it unpersuasive: “Kant does not ex-
plain the key moves that he takes to support the relevant claim ... that there 
is a connection between humanity’s being an end in itself and our having a 
duty to choose to pursue culture over pleasure” (109). Murray then explores 
Kant’s second path to arguing in favour of culture, his argument from the 
Appendix to the Critique of Teleological Judgment, where Kant claims that 
a life spent in pursuit of enjoyment at the expense of culture is not com-
patible with living a worthwhile human life. Kant’s argumentation here is 
complex and in order to present it in its fullness, Murray brings it in con-
nection to Kant’s views on the nature and humanity’s end, on the connec-
458 Book Reviews
tion between purpose and worth, on refl ective and determinative judgement 
and the regulative use of reason. Murray concludes that this is another 
unconvincing way to ground Kant’s insistence on the supremacy of culture 
over personal satisfactions, emphasizing two diffi culties with the Appendix 
argument: “those relating to the interpretation of nature, and those relating 
to the claim that we are to think regulatively of humanity as the ultimate 
end of nature” (118).  However, the Appendix argument is relevant for ex-
plaining the “ethical underpinnings of Kant’s aesthetics” (118), concludes 
Murray, in that it provides support to those who are committed to pursuing 
culture, and it has a valuable role in fending off anti-aesthetics arguments.
Finally, in conclusion, after summarizing the main claims of the book, 
Murray addresses two further questions: the moral relevance of the expe-
riences of ugliness, and the status of the empirical elements within Kant’s 
aesthetics. With respect to the possible moral relevance of ugliness, Murray 
only sketchily hints at the possibility that ugliness, which triggers displea-
sure, might in fact be connected to our feelings of hatred and ingratitude. 
These, in turn are likely to make it harder for us to resist our inclinations and 
consequently, to make us self-cantered and therefore isolated from others. 
Regarding the empiricism in Kant’s aesthetics, Murray emphasizes the role 
that Kant’s pragmatic anthropology (i.e. his view of culture, which rests on 
his views concerning what human beings tend to be like, that is, what they 
make of themselves) plays in his elaboration of the connection between aes-
thetics and morality. Murray is here primarily concerned with justifying the 
inclusion of empirical claims into a philosophical investigation, particularly 
into those such as Kant’s—recall that Kant’s aesthetic theory is primarily 
concerned with an a priori account of the justifi cation of aesthetic judgments. 
However, concludes Murray, “although Kant is against empiricist accounts of 
aesthetic judgments such as Burke’s, this does not mean that Kant’s aesthetic 
theory rests on theses that are wholly a priori” (134, italics original).
Given the complexity of Kant’s overall philosophy, combining his an-
thropological writings with his aesthetics in order to make the bond be-
tween aesthetic pleasure and moral development stronger is certainly not 
a small task. Murray is to be complimented for his skills in systematising, 
as well as for the detailed and meticulous analyses he conducts with re-
spect to each of Kant’s claims he scrutinizes. It is worth pointing out that 
Murray’s analysis of the relation between aesthetics, anthropology and eth-
ics in Kant’s philosophy is not severed from other Kantians’ positions, and 
while he does not engage with polemics and debates in the main text, the 
footnotes to each chapter provide for insightful pointers on views of other 
scholars and Murray’s position compared to theirs.
There is however always a problem of choice, and one can wonder why 
Murray neglects taking into account several issues that fi gure prominently 
in Kant’s account of the connection between aesthetic judgment and culture. 
For example, surprisingly little is said regarding the sociability, and the in-
terconnection of sensus communis, sociability and communication (particu-
larly regarding Kant’s treatment of these in §§ 39–40 of the third Critique). 
Another aspect of Kant’s third Critique suspiciously absent from Murray’s 
analysis is a distinction between (and the implied relevance of both) empiri-
cal and intellectual interest in beauty. Perhaps less important for the ques-
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tion of sociability, but signifi cant for how one comes to appreciate beauty, 
is Kant’s discussion of the ideal of beauty (§ 17),which is also surprisingly 
neglected in Murray’s reading. The book could also profi t if more space was 
given to a topic that Murray only sketches, namely, the connection between 
ugliness and hatred. While it would be interesting to hear more on why 
someone would deliberately go after experiences of ugliness (particularly if 
this was considered as a variant of Hume-inspired questions regarding the 
unpleasant feelings that are part of our experience of viewing tragedy), it 
would be interesting to see if the experiences of ugly (i.e. pursuit of aesthetic 
displeasure) might somehow fi gure in the explanation of the aesthetics of 
shock, or in pursuits of ‘ugly’ or ‘painful’ art. The narrowness of Murray’s ap-
proach of course parallels the narrowness of Kant’s theory of art, as ground-
ed in the 18th century conception of art, but it is worth pointing out that 
Murray occasionally makes a welcome effort to evaluate Kant’s views from 
the perspective of some contemporary artistic trends and practices.
Irrespectively of these ‘omissions’ (which do not necessarily hamper the 
overall insightfulness of the book), I do have some worries regarding Mur-
ray’s analysis. First, I wonder how plausible his account of disinterestedness 
(with respect to nature as well as to art) is. Of course, Kant himself, as often 
emphasized by his commentators, shoots for the moon and famously misses, 
when he demands that aesthetic judgment be disinterested. Murray’s solu-
tion, according to which what suffi ces for disinterestedness is that a desire 
for the object’s existence not be central to the pleasure one feels, while theo-
retically satisfying, might be tricky from the practical perspective: is it really 
possible for one to gain such a clear perspective on one’s pleasure to say with 
certainty which aspect is central, and which only secondary, to the experi-
ence? With respect to art, Murray’s claim that disinterestedness is a matter 
of degree dependent on how far one is capable of abstracting, seems more 
convincing with respect to some art forms than with others. While one may 
marvel at the form of the statue or a symphony, it is hard to understand how 
we might approach literary works or works of narrative art in such a way. 
The tension here is as much a problem for Kant as it is for Murray.
Second, Murray’s analysis of aesthetic ideas seems superfi cial. Murray 
makes a valid point in raising concerns regarding the metaphysical account 
of aesthetic ideas—we can indeed marvel at the beauty of a well crafted 
copy and mistake it for the original. However, while Kant can be criticized 
for having missed this possibility, it is worth remembering that his account 
of aesthetic ideas is primarily put forward to explain creation of art, not its 
reception—he barely says anything explicit regarding the audience’s take 
on aesthetic ideas. Kant however makes a substantial effort to explain the 
relevance of aesthetic ideas for a moral development, and Murray is com-
pletely silent with respect to it (although explaining the moral relevance 
of our aesthetic pursuits is his prime concern in this book). Kant’s claims 
in §52, where he urges beautiful art to be connected with moral ideas pro-
vides, on my understanding of Kant’s aesthetic ideas, for a fi rm connection 
between art and our moral development. It is disappointing that Murray 
ignores it altogether.
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